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'Much of the discussion of the renvoi doctrine has proceeded on 
the basis that the choice lies in all cases between its absolute 
acceptance and its absolute rejection. The truth would appear to be 
that in some situations the doctrine is convenient and promotes 
justice, and that in other situations the doctrine is inconvenient and 
ought to be rejected' .469 
Conflicting views and different approaches seem synonymous with 
the doctrine of renvoi. It has been regarded by some as a distortion 
of choice of law principles, while others praise its merits and 
advocate its 'absolute acceptance'. 
The ambivalent attitudes that surround renvoi reflect the ambiguity 
of the subject which the doctrine strives to address - how one is to 
understand the reference to a foreign lex causae. As Dicey and 
Morris point out
,_ 
the term 'law of a country' can mean, in its 
narrower and more usual sense, the domestic law of any country; 
alternatively, it can refer in its wider sense to all the rules, 
including the rules of the conflict of laws, which the courts of a 
country apply to a particular case. This ambiguity of expression 
gives rise to the very problem of renvoi.
470 
This attitude is mirrored 
in the development of the concept, which has neither been steady 
nor principled.471 




471 Bremer v Freeman (1857) IO 
against the doctrine. 
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Broadly speaking, there exist two divergent approaches to the 
subject. A somewhat absolutist approach would entail accepting 
or rejecting the doctrine in its entirety. On the other hand, the 
more moderate stance would recognise the worth of the doctrine by 
focussing on areas of the subject wherein it may be put to optimal 
use, while, at the same time, showing up the areas where the 
doctrine would do best not to intrude. 
It is proposed to deal with both approaches and conclude that a 
proper understanding of the doctrine of renvoi requires an 
understanding of how the various parts of the conflict of laws fit 
together and that renvoi is an essential part of an integral whole -
with the logical conclusion that its complete eradication would in 
effect cause the conflicts edifice to fall like a pack of cards. 
Renvoi is, as Briggs states, the 'subject's principal tendon';472 but -
if I may extend the metaphor slightly further - tendons, though 
essential, are not put to use all the time and for all the activities of 
the body of which it forms part, - such is the case with renvoi: its 
constant use and application in every part of the subject will be just 
as disastrous as its total annihilation. 
The aim of renvoi can be seen as striving to achieve a measure of 
international harmony amidst the contextual environment of 
private international law. In cases involving a foreign element, it 
is clearly desirable that the issue will be determined in the same 
way in any of the courts of the States which are connected with it. 
However, the fact that different connecting factors are used in 
different systems militates against this ideal solution. This is the 
state of affairs that renvoi addresses and provides an argument for 
supporting its application. 
472 Briggs A., 'In Praise and Defence of Renvoi', International and Comparative Law 
Quarterley 47 (1998), 877 - 884. 
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The Theories of Renvoi 
The 'internal law theory ,4
73 
rejects the doctrine of renvoi and it is 
this that in some authors ' opinion is 'in general correct and 
desirable'. 474 The reference to the 'law of X' is interpreted as being 
a reference to the internal law of X, without reference to its 
conflicts rules. This method therefore requires proof of the 
domestic law of the foreign country, but does not require proof of 
its conflict rules. 475 It seems that if this rule were adopted 
everywhere, each conflicts system would in itself be perfectly 
consistent, but the diversity of connecting factors would have an 
injurious impact on international harmony. 476 
Moving forward along the doctrinal journey, the approach of 
adopting single or partial renvoi, involves construing the reference 
to the foreign law as a reference to the whole of that system's law. 
Further on still, one finds the doctrine of Total Renvoi, also known 
as the Double Renvoi or Foreign Court Theory, which dictates that 
the forum judge who is referred by his own law to the legal system 
of a foreign country must apply whatever law a court in that 
foreign country would apply if it were hearing the case. This 
involves a reference to that system's entire law, including not only 
its conflict rules but also the policy with regard to renvoi itself, in 
order to arrive at the very same conclusion as the judge sitting in 
the other forum would arrive at. The forum judge therefore steps in 
to the shoes of the foreign judge and decides the case. For this 
reason it is also known as 'Impersonating the Foreign Judge'. This 
approach involves accepting the foreign country's rules as to renvoi 
and doing whatever the foreign judge would do. In this way, if the 
473 Also referred to as the Simple, Rational or Internal Law Theory. 
474 See for example, North P.M. and Fawcett J.J., Cheshire and North's Private International 
Law, 13th ed., London: Butterworths, 1999 
475 This approach has been adopted in two early English decisions: Hamilton v Dallas (1875) 
1 Ch D 257 and Bremer v Freeman (1857), above at note 3. This approach was also 
directed to be used by the Law Commission in most recent reforms to the English conflict of 
laws. 
476 Kahn-Freund 0., General Problems of Private International Law, Aspen Publishers, 
reprint of 1976 the edition, 1981 
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foreign law refers to English law and rejects the renvoi doctrine 
altogether, the result is that the forum's domestic law is applicable, 
while if the foreign law refers to the law of the forum, and adopts 
the doctrine of single renvoi, the result is that the foreign domestic 
law is applicable. 
It is perhaps this latter theory which has been subjected to most 
criticism which would strive to argue that 'in all but exceptional 
cases the theoretical and practical difficulties involved in applying 
the doctrine outweigh any supposed advantages it may possess. '477 
Criticism 
It has been stated that the contention of those who favour the 
doctrine of renvoi is that it ensures that the same decision will be 
given on the same disputed facts irrespective of where the case is 
heard. However, renvoi does not necessary entail uniform 
decisions. Apart from the problems which arise should the foreign 
court also adopt the total renvoi theory, another obstacle to 
uniformity is that the forum judge cannot don the mantle of the 
foreign judge without reservations since a matter classified as 
procedural according to the law of the forum will be submitted to 
the forum's internal law, even though the foreign judge may have 
regarded it as substantive; moreover, a rule may not be able to be 
applied on grounds of public policy or because it is a penal, 
revenue or other public law matter. In such case, the application of 
the rules of foreign law will be excluded. 
The total renvoi doctrine is simply very difficult to apply. Not only 
must the judge ascertain the precise decision the foreign judge will 
give but he must ascertain as a fact the precise position that 
prevails in the foreign country with regard to single renvoi. 
477 Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of laws, and Cheshire and North, Private International 
Law, above at notes 1 and 6 respectively. 
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Another criticism levelled against the doctrine is its 
unpredictability of result since it makes everything defend on 'the
doubtful and conflicting evidence of foreign experts'. 47 It must be 
borne in mind that foreign law is a question of fact and has to be 
proved by evidence in each case; if the evidence is inadequate, no 
issue of renvoi may be said to arise. This in itself may lead to 
conflicting decisions - depending on the strength of the evidence in 
each case. Moreover, renvoi requires proof not only of the conflict 
rules of the foreign country, but also of the foreign rules about 
renvoi - an even harder issue regarding which to obtain reliable 
information. 
In the ultimate analysis, it may just be fanciful for the forum judge 
to think that he is impersonating the foreign judge - apart from the 
issues of procedure and public policy mentioned earlier, he cannot 
even be expected to know the substance of the foreign applicable 
law. 
Morris held that renvoi was a thoroughly bad thing.479 He was of 
the opinion that the English choice of law rules were historically 
devised without any thought to renvoi, so that they would 
effectively operate as selective rules for the application of foreign 
domestic laws alone. Accordingly, it amounted to a subversion of 
the English choice of law rules if the judge chooses a particular law 
but then allows a foreign judge to apply his own choice of law rules 
to 'jettison' the English choice of law rule. However, this objection 
may be met by conceiving of two types of choice of law rules - one 
set does indeed comprise of a framework of reference to domestic 
law; but then, in other areas there can be seen to be rules which 
make reference to foreign jurisdictions, in the sense that the rules 
do not point to a particular law but provide a mechanism for 
finding it. 
478 
Re Askew 1930 2 Ch. 259 
479 McClean J.D., Morris: The Conflict of Laws, 5th ed, London: Sweet and Maxwell, 2000 
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Indeed, with regard to the rhetoric of renvoi, most of the objections 
levelled against the doctrine boil down to the allegation that the 
forum court abandons its own choice of law rules and defers to the 
superior authority of a foreign choice of law rule. Through this 
two-stage process, the forum's choice of law rule is overridden and 
displaced, thereby representing a loss of control by the domestic 
court. 
However, these objections fade if we conceive of the issue as a 
one-stage process; that the choice of law rule of the forum is - to 
choose the law which a foreign judge would apply; for example, 
'that the English choice of law rule for capacity to marry is that it is 
governed by that law which would be applied to the case by a judge 
sitting at the place where the propositus is domiciled.' In this way, 
the court would be choosing the law 'by formula rather than by 
immediate geographic designation' .
480 
This approach does away 
with any considerations of preference and superiority accorded to a 
foreign choice of law rule because it is the forum's choice of law 
rule that directs the forum judge to whatever law the foreign judge 
would apply. Still, universal and constant use of the renvoi 
doctrine cannot be the ideal position; an equilibrium must be found. 
Finding the Equilibrium 
It is recognised that renvoi is inapplicable in many cases. Amongst 
these areas are those such as contract and tort - can this be said to 
be correct in all cases? A look at the English experience may 
clarify things somewhat. 
Starting from the concept of tort, section 9( 5) of the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1995 excludes 
any reference to renvoi: 
480 Briggs, above at note 4, 882 
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'The applicable law to be used for determining the issues arising in 
a claim shall exclude any choice of law rules forming part of the 
law of the country or countries concerned'. 
With regard to matters falling outside the Act and governed by the 
Common law, there is no direct English authority; however 
Scottish and US authority indicate that renvoi is inapplicable to tort 
cases.
481 
Clearly, while the commission of a tort is unexpected, the 
contingency is not unforeseen; the aim of excluding renvoi is 
accordingly, to prevent the frustration of any action which may 
have been taken to provide for such possibility. Therefore, the 
justification for this is that in many cases, such as insurance, were 
the English court to apply anything other than the foreign domestic 
law, this could amount to contradicting the assumptions upon 
which the policy was taken out. 
Nevertheless, the exclusion of renvoi in this field of the conflict of 
laws has had the result of limiting, if not preventing altogether, the 
English court from controlling forum shopping. There seems to be 
no doubt that Lord Wilberforce's reference in Boys v Chaplin 
(1971/82 to the lex loci delicti was intended to prevent forum­
shopping. He sought to construct a choice of law rule by 
preventing the parties from evading the operation of the proper law. 
The concern was with the possibility of a Maltese citizen suing 
another compatriot in England for damages for pain and suffering. 
Only if the reference to the lex loci delicti was held to include a 
reference to the conflict rules of the foreign country would the 
English judge be empowered to decide the case in the same way as 
a Maltese/Ontarian judge would decide it - and thus discourage 
forum-shopping. 
481 M'Elroy v M'Allister (1949) S.C. 110; Haumschild v Continental Casualty Co (1959) 7 
Wis. 2d 130 
482 (1971) AC. 356 
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Shortly after, another method through which the English courts 
could control forum shopping came with Spiliada483. Control of 
forum shopping did not need to depend solely on choice of law, but 
could be dealt with directly - through the jurisdictional solution: 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
However, within the English context, it may be persuasively argued 
that the Brussels and Lugano Conventions on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
484 
has 
severely limited the court's powers to stay proceedings on forum 
non conveniens grounds. Since the jurisdictional solution is no 
longer available, the choice of law solution becomes all the more 
attractive as it allows the court to fabricate the doctrine forum non 
conveniens by reference to its choice of law rules. 
The relationship between renvoi and principles of jurisdiction is 
demonstrated by reference to the decision of the High Court of 
Australia in Breavington v Godleman where three judges held 
that the case should be decided as if it had been tried in the courts 
of the Northern Territory (the lex loci delicti).485 This reliance on 
choice of law rules to discourage forum shopping was probably 
connected to the fact that the Court had just rejected the English 
version of forum non conveniens in Oceanic Sun Line Special 
Shipping Co. Inc. v Fay, and therefore was less able to prevent 
forum shopping by use of jurisdictional rules.486 
In the face of this, the Law Commission's decision to exclude 
renvoi from the law of tort appears to be misguided; as does the 
approach taken in the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (where 
under section 1 ( 1) one applies conflicts of law rules to arrive at the 
483 Spiliada Maritime Corporation v Cansulex Ltd (1987) AC. 460, HL 
484 Consolidated version published in 1998 (Official Journal, 27,26.02.1998). The Lugano 
Convention has been incorporated into Maltese law by the Legal Procedures (Ratification of 
Conventions) Act, Cap 443 Laws of Malta. 
485 (1989) 169 C.L.R. 41 
486 (1988) 165 C.L.R. 197 
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law governing the issue, and then under section 1(5) it 1s the 
domestic law of that country which is applicable). 
This is also the position with regard to the law of contract under 
article 15 of the Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual 
Obligations.487 The general refusal to apply renvoi to contracts is 
based on the view that a contract specifying a particular law would 
always mean the domestic law as otherwise the parties' 
expectations would be defeated. 
However, what is the position where the parties have expressly 
made not a choice of law, but a choice of court? The generally 
assumed position is that this constitutes a strong presumption that 
the domestic law of chosen court will apply; the Rome Convention 
takes a similar approach, as is noted from the Giuliano and Lagarde 
Report.488 This does not seem to necessarily accord with the 
parties' expectations: if they wanted litigation to take place in a 
particular court, it seems to follow that they would have opted for 
the law which would have been applied by a judge sitting in that 
court - this undoubtedly would include that forum's conflict rules. 
Renvoi-reasoning would ensure such conclusion; however, the 
dogmatic exclusion of the concept militates against such an 
approach with the result that the parties' intentions cannot be given 
effect to. It is for this reason Briggs states that whilst the 
unsupervised administration of a doctrine of renvoi may be capable 
of upsetting the sensible intentions of commercial men, a 
principled use of the technique may be the only way of giving 
effect to them. 
489 
Renvoi is clearly an integral part of the conflict of laws. This is 
further seen in the characterisation exercise: acceptance of renvoi 
487 Rome Convention (1980) OJ L266 of 9 October. Consolidated version found in (1998) 
OJ C27/47. This does not form part of Maltese law but is part of English law, for example. 
The relevant domestic provisions in this regard are found in the Contracts (Applicable Law) 
Act (1990) c. 36, Schedule 1. Renvoi is also excluded in the common law of contracts, as is 
seen from Amin Rasheed Shipping Corpn v Kuwait Insurance Co, the Al Wahab (1984) AC 
50 and Re United Railways of Havana and Regla Warehouses Ltd (1960) Ch 52. 
488 (180) OJ C282/17
489 Briggs, above at note 4.
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explains the different approaches taken in this area. In cases 
where renvoi operates, we are not to tie the foreign judge's hands 
binding him to the forum's characterisation of the issue; for 
example, whether (in a case of marriage without obtaining the 
requisite parental consent) the marriage is formally valid. The 
correct approach is to ask the judge to whose law we are referred 
whether or not the marriage is valid by reason of the lack of 
parental consent. This is clearly not necessary in cases where 
renvoi does not operate; here there is no concern with what a 
foreign judge would do and there is not reason why we cannot first 
characterise the issue according to the rules of the lex fori and 
then, frame the question in these terms. 
A renvoi-type reasoning is also perceived in the Incidental 
Question in the sense that the subsidiary issue is referred to the law 
governing the main question for its determination.
490 
Dicey and Morris state that the doctrine should not be invoked 
unless it is plain that the object of the English conflict rule in 
referring to a foreign law will, on balance, be better served by 
construing the reference to mean the conflict rules of that law.
491 
This contention neither advocates its total exclusion, nor its 
absolute acceptance. However, the ideal solution need not lie at 
either of the two extremes; rather, in order to provide the necessary 
flexibility and justice, it appears essential that the doctrine of 
renvoi applies only in those situations where such goal can be 
achieved. This is why it may seem misguided to argue for its non­
application in all cases in certain issues such as contract and tort. 
Regarding it as an irritant will necessarily detract from its worth in 
weaving a net over many issues in the conflict of laws and 
contributing to its consistency and coherence. 
In this respect, as Briggs points out that 'it operates not as a 
refinement or complication to rules for choice of law, but the 
490 Schwebel v Ungar (1963) 42 D.L.R. (2d) 622 (Ont. C.A.); Lawrence v Lawrence (1985) 
Fam. 106. 
491 Dicey and Morris, above at note 1. 
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mechanism which supplies the intellectual harmony, or co­
ordination, between rules on jurisdiction and rules on choice of 
law. '492 In fact, this argument is taken as far as to state that while 
this does not mean that the doctrine should be applied at all times 
and in all cases, its application should preferably be regarded as the 
rule, rather than the exception, thus departing somewhat from 
D · d L<. · , t t" 493 zcey an 1norrzs s con en 10n. 
In the ultimate analysis, Kahn-Freund's concluding point seems to 
address the ideal approach - whatever attitude academic writers 
choose to adopt, the solution to the application of the doctrine 
should not depend on any a priori principle, such as that of the 
'inherent' nature of a reference to a foreign law as a reference to 
internal law only or as a 'total' reference including conflicts of law 
rules.494 It is advisable therefore to approach the question 
pragmatically rather than dogmatically, proceeding on a case by 
case analysis and providing for the application of renvoi when it 
promotes justice, without being hindered from so doing by 'no­
renvoi clauses' and the like, since such blatant rigidity can hardly 
be the key to a just conclusion in any case. 
Patricia Cassar Torregiani 
March 2006 
492 
Above at note 4 
493 
Above at note 1 
494 
Above at note 8 
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